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A Brazilian-Type Debt Crisis: Simple Analytics
ASSAF RAZIN and EFRAIM SADKA*
This paper develops a model that captures important features of debt crises of the
Brazilian type. Its applicability to Brazil lies in the facts that (1) macroeconomic
fundamentals were relatively sound in the wake of the crisis (e.g., a nonnegligible
primary surplus, a relatively low debt-GDP ratio, and low inflation); and (2) the
trigger for the crisis—forthcoming elections with an expected regime change—
appears to be extraneous. We rationalize the sort of circularity involved in a coun-
try’s credit rating. In particular, we show how country credit ratings could bring
about unstable macroeconomic behavior, and explore the implications of such
behavior for fiscal policy. [JEL F21, F34, G15]
B
razil’s public finances appeared to have been in a shambles prior to the elec-
tion in October 2002. The September 2002 stand-by credit gave Brazil a crit-
ical boost, providing the central bank with an additional $16 billion in international
reserves to defend its weak currency and thereby to contain the explosion of dollar-
linked public debt service.1 The package also included a promise to increase the
available funds to $30 billion, if the primary surplus had increased. Because three-
fourths of Brazil’s debt is in domestic currency, and about one-third of this debt is
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1Although only $6 billion of the new arrangement with the IMF was available in 2002, Brazil’s cen-
tral bank was also given more flexibility under the program, which cut to $5 billion (from $15 billion) the
minimum level of reserves the central bank promises to hold. Thus, in effect, the central bank had an addi-
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indexed to the dollar, the policy challenge was not only to defend the strength of
Brazil’s currency, but also to reduce the level and volatility of domestic interest
rates. However, because most of Brazil’s local currency debt is short term, and thus
effectively indexed to the rate of interest, Brazil seems to have been vulnerable to
self-fulfilling-expectations reversals in capital flows, with the country-risk ratings
at the center of the expectations-coordination failure. But, since the presidential
elections in October 2002 that brought to power the leftist Workers’Party, which
had a history of anti-market sloganeering, the new government has worked to
reassure the markets that Brazil would pay its debts, curb its budget deficits, and
reduce inflation. By March 2003, Brazil’s currency had appreciated and the risk
premium that investors demand for holding Brazilian debt had dropped signifi-
cantly (from more than 20 percentage points in October 2002 to 10 percentage points
by March 2003). Did credit rating institutions contribute to an overreaction by the
markets in the run-up for Brazil’s 2002 election? The Economist (2003), though in
a domestic regulation context, describes the potential circularity associated with
ratings as follows:
As ratings have been more widely used in regulation, they have begun to
affect the market, in a version of Goodhart’s law (that any variable cho-
sen as a monetary-policy target immediately starts to behave differently).
Because regulators and banks use ratings to assess credit risk, a rating
downgrade can itself become a trigger requiring higher interest payments
from a borrower or even driving it into bankruptcy. Similarly, rather as
teachers often teach to the test, financial instruments are increasingly
designed solely to carry a particular rating, not the other way round.
In this paper we rationalize the sort of circularity involved in country credit
ratings. Our main purpose is to develop a simple, textbook-like exposition of how
country credit ratings could bring about unstable macroeconomic behavior, and to
explore its implications for fiscal policy. We have previously dealt with this sub-
ject in Razin and Sadka (2001). The main differences between this paper and our
earlier paper are as follows. (1) Investment behavior in this paper is neoclassical,
to assure the reader that no other credit frictions are crucial to the argument. In
contrast, in our earlier paper investors are subject to a costly state verification to
accommodate for potential defaults (as in Townsend, 1979). (2) This paper deals with
fiscal policy implications, while in the earlier work we glossed over such impli-
cations. (3) The main insight to be obtained from this paper comes from a simple
diagrammatic analysis. Thus, our main argument is not clouded by algebra. This
paper is also related to Velasco (1996). That paper’s model, however, deals with a
different macroeconomic mechanism that could lead to coordination failure. Con-
sequently, the fiscal policy implications are also quite different.
I. Textbook Model
Consider a small open economy that borrows in the world capital markets at a rate
r, which includes a country-specific risk premium. Suppose that the initial stock of
capital of a representative firm is (1 – δ)K0, where δ is the rate of depreciation andAssaf Razin and Efraim Sadka
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K0 is previous period capital. With this stock at hand, the firm invests at present
so as to adjust its capital stock to K to maximize its value. This gives rise to a
Bellman equation as follows:
(1)
where F(.) is a production function, V(.) is a value function, t is a current (distor-
tionary) tax, and α is a parameter that captures expected future corporate taxes.
Naturally, higher future taxes should reduce α. Thus, the derivative of the function
V′(.) must always be equal to one.2 The first-order condition is given by
(2)
Because investment is irreversible no new investment occurs when
(3)
Naturally, the country’s credit rating is external to our (identical) competitive
firms, and depends on some aggregate (macro) economic variables that character-
ize the macroeconomic state of the country. Suppose that these macro variables are
two. The first variable is the growth prospect of the economy as measured by the
private stock of capital (K); the second variable denotes the fiscal stance of the
government, as measured by the primary surplus of the government. The higher
the surplus, the less likely that the government will have to increase taxes in the
future (that is, the higher also is α). Accordingly, we assume that the country-specific
interest rate is a decreasing function of both (K) and α:
(4)
Equation (4) captures plausibly country risk rating based on aggregate macro-
economic variables, which yields a macroeconomic externality. It is admittedly ad
hoc. But this reduced-form relationship is of a more general validity. It seems that
this macroeconomic externality can also be rationalized in a more micro-founded
relationship of this sort.
Given the current fiscal stance of the government, and the implied future tax-
ation as captured by α; equations (2) (or condition (3)) and (4) equations (1) and
rr K = () ,. α
11 1 1 0 − () ′ − () () <++− () − () tF K r δδ α δ .












1 00 − () [] =
−
+
() −− − () [] +
+
− () [] {} δδ α δ Max ,
2Why should V′(.) = 1, as implied by equation (2)? The derivative of the maximand in equation (1)
with respect to K yields











′ − () []   
  
+− ()→ ′ − () [] = δδ
δ
























αδ.A BRAZILIAN-TYPE DEBT CRISIS
151
(2) jointly determine r and K. This is illustrated in Figure 1. Equation (2) is
depicted by the curve AB (recall that F is concave in K). Equation (4) is depicted
by the curve E1E2E3H.
There are potentially three equilibrium points—at E1, E2, and E3. We can
ignore the equilibrium at E2, as it is not Walras-stable: If the stock of private cap-
ital rises above K*, then r = r(K, α) falls, and each firm will tend to further increase
its capital stock, moving further away from the equilibrium; a similar divergent
out-of-equilibrium process occurs if K falls below K*.
We refer to the equilibrium point at E1 as the “bad” equilibrium. At this
equilibrium the interest rate r[(1 −δ )K0, α] is “high,” above (1 − t)F′(K0) −δ−
(1 −α )(1 −δ ), so that no firm will choose to invest at all, as indicated by condition
(3). We refer to the equilibrium at the point E3 as the “good” equilibrium, in which
(1 − t)F′(K**, α) = r +δ+(1 −α )(1 −δ ) and firms have incentives to increase their
capital stock to K** from (1 −δ )K0.
II. Self-Fulfilling Credit Ratings
Our textbook model can now be used to highlight the problem of self-fulfilling
credit ratings. Suppose that the economy is initially at the “good” equilibrium: pri-
vate domestic investment is relatively high and the country-specific risk premium
is relatively low. However, triggered by extraneous shocks, the country may
switch abruptly from this “good” equilibrium to the “bad” equilibrium. Such
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Figure 1. The Stock of Private Capital and the Country-Specific Interest RateAssaf Razin and Efraim Sadka
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redirect market expectations and move the entire equilibrium point. An example
of such a political factor is the emergence of a rookie candidate for presidency
whose future policies are uncertain in the eyes of international investors. Creditors
would then shift their beliefs about the country’s creditworthiness, which in turn
would shift the market. These beliefs (that the country is at high credit risk) then
become self-fulfilling and, indeed, the country’s investments dry out.3
III. Corrective Policies
Apossible remedy is to raise the primary surplus. This would reduce future taxes,




3. The primary surplus
increases by cutting spending, rather than by raising current taxes (in this case, t
does not change). Therefore, the increase in α also shifts out the curve AB to A′B′.
In this case, the “bad” equilibrium (and also the unstable equilibrium) may alto-
gether disappear. Despite the initial decline in the country’s credit rating that made
the country land on the bad equilibrium point E1, the country moves to a new
“good” equilibrium with an even better credit rating and more investment. If, how-
ever, the primary surplus is raised by increasing current taxes and not by cutting
spending (that is, by increasing t,) then the curve AB need not shift out at all. In
this case, all three equilibria may remain, and the country is still vulnerable to self-
fulfilling credit-rating crunches.
Thus, raising the primary surplus as such is not necessarily a cure for a
Brazilian-type debt crisis. It is effective when the policy is a government spend-
ing cut, but not necessarily when taxes are raised.
IV. Conclusion
Our simple credit-rating model captures key features of the Brazil-type debt cri-
sis. Its applicability to Brazil lies in two common features.
(1) Both in the model and in the case of Brazil, macro fundamentals are not
shaky (e.g., the primary surplus in Brazil in the wake of the crisis was about
2.25 percent of the GNP).
(2) Both in the model and in the Brazilian case, the “coordinator” of market
expectations that shift the market outcome is extraneous to the market econ-
omy. In Brazil the expectations coordinator appears to have been forth-
coming elections with a possibility of regime change.
Recently, to tackle the crisis Brazil raised its primary surplus target to 3.75−
4.25 percent of GDP; as in our model, in the preceding section. Whether Brazil
can return to robust growth seems to depend crucially on whether lower interest
rates can be restored, as in our model.
3See our earlier paper (Razin and Sadka, 2001) for a similar mechanism that creates boom-bust cycles.
A related treatment is Calvo (1988), which is concerned about the debt-service issue.A BRAZILIAN-TYPE DEBT CRISIS
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